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Medium Term Fiscal Frameworks (MTFs) have become one of the most popular 
reforms to the budgetary process in Latin America during the last decade, and 
introducing MTFs seemed to be the magic solution for most fiscal ailments. 
Nonetheless, there has been no comprehensive evaluation of their impact. This 
document discusses the normative merits of using MTFs, provides a 
characterization of the different types of MTF, and describes their development in 
the Latin American region based on extensive field work. As a first 
approximation for understanding how they are working, this document explores in 
detail the cases of Argentina, Colombia and Peru. While an unambiguous 
diagnosis is not possible, this document lays the groundwork for progress toward 
comprehensive impact evaluations and, eventually, to the consolidation of MTFs 
in the region.  
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1.  Introduction 
“When the plan ambitiously portrays a bountiful future with enhanced public services, 
but the budget fails to make a down-payment on that future—it does not allocate 
spending increases to social programs—then the government probably is using the plan 
to escape from its dire predicament.” Schick (1998, p. 38)  
 
 
The budgetary process of a country is where decisions about how much to spend and on what are 
made. In a democratic context, the decisions are not made by a social planner, but they are the 
result of negotiations among a set of actors, each with its own preferences and incentives. Thus, 
the president and his/her ministers, legislators, civil servants, and civil society actors interact in 
the different stages of the process to set their priorities, attempt to influence the amounts and the 
form in which the resources are allocated, and try to ensure that the promises are fulfilled. The 
role of each of these actors varies from country to country, according to both what type of 
institutions oversee the operation of the process in its different stages and the capacity of each 
actor to make use of its prerogatives in the process. 
  The budget process is not an isolated discussion. On the contrary, it is one of the most 
important bills—if not the single most important bill—to be discussed each year in a country. 
Because almost each policy has a budgetary component (affecting spending, income, and 
financing decisions, among others), each one has to be discussed during the budgetary process. 
  Despite the fact that the budget process has usually been considered as a technocratic 
process, this is rarely the case. Budget decisions are significant not only in terms of their 
implications for the efficiency and effectiveness for reaching a policy goal, but also in terms of 
their political implications. Through the budget process not only are public policies financed, but 
they can also be used to compensate those affected by certain reforms, and the foundations can 
be laid for forming coalitions that may help to implement the government’s agenda (Filc, 
Scartascini, and Stein, 2005; Hallerberg, Scartascini and Stein, 2009b). In some countries, it may 
become the mechanism to hold agreements together and sustain coalitions. Consequently, the 
budget process is at the core of the more general policymaking process. 
  Budgets, therefore, are a key tool for the implementation of public policies and in some 
cases for ensuring the durability of the government. However, the annual horizon of traditional 
budgets entails certain limitations that reduce their potential for ensuring a correct execution of 
governmental policy. In terms of the efficiency of expenditures and their accounting, public 
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policies and public works have implications that transcend the budget year. First, administrative 
processes, such as bids, can extend beyond the calendar year. Second, infrastructure projects can 
take many years to be completed. Third, capital investments may entail future operating 
expenses. When these aspects are not taken into account, public finances and the success of 
policies can be negatively affected (programs are started but their long-term financing needs may 
not be secured.) All these factors imply that the annual budget process is not adequately 
integrated with the planning of public policies.   
  From a political perspective, yearly budgets may not be the best mechanism for 
cementing long-term agreements. With a yearly budget, some policies have to be negotiated 
every year, making them less likely to survive. In response, many countries have introduced 
earmarks, which make annual budgets more rigid.  In the long run, earmarks are making it harder 
for governments to adapt the budget to the needs of the moment.
1 Alternatively, policies are 
subject to high volatility according to changes in political winds and the weakening of political 
coalitions. 
  In the Latin American context, the weaknesses of annual budget processes—reflected in 
problems related to the sustainability and efficiency of public policies—have been persistent. In 
contrast to this, medium-term frameworks (MTF) can provide a better foundation for the 
discussion of public policies and reduce some of the deficiencies of annual budgets. 
  Unfortunately, MTFs do not provide a magic solution. As Schiavo-Campo (2009: 1) 
states, “By neglecting institutional and capacity considerations, medium-term expenditure 
frameworks (MTEF) introduction has produced in most developing countries elaborate facades 
of fiscal reform at high transaction costs without improving budgetary outcomes.” Therefore, 
MTFs are not for every country. If they are adopted, they have to be sufficiently tailored, and 
steps should be taken to ensure that they are implemented under conditions conducive to success.    
  This document complements Schiavo-Campo (2009) by discussing the normative merits 
of using MTFs, providing a characterization of the different types of MTF, and describing their 
development in the Latin American region based on extensive field work. As a first 
approximation for understanding how they have been working, this document explores in detail 
the cases of Argentina, Colombia and Peru. The initial evidence indicates that there is still a long 
                                                            
1 For an overview for several LAC countries see Echeverry, Bonilla and Moya (2006). The eight country chapters in 
Hallerberg, Scartascini, and Stein (2009a) describe the situation in terms of rigidities in detail. 
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way to go before MTFs can help to solve the problems of the budgetary process in the region. 
Relatively low capacity and participation of key actors in the bureaucracy, lack of coordination 
among certain areas and across levels of governments, and intermittent and relatively weak flows 
of information and statistics seem to conspire against the objectives of the frameworks.  
  Although the diagnosis is still preliminary to be considered a comprehensive evaluation, 
the evidence and the information in this document lays the groundwork that should help to 
advance towards comprehensive impact evaluations and eventually to the consolidation of the 
MTFs in the region. 
 
2. The Medium-Term Frameworks 
 
2.1 Definition and Objectives 
 
Medium-term frameworks are institutional tools aimed at extending the planning horizon of 
public policies beyond the annual budget schedule but without the characteristic deficiencies of 
medium-term development plans (Shack, 2008).
2 The emergence of different MTF experiences 
in developing countries took place mostly starting in the second half of the 1990s. According to a 
World Bank report (2001), at the beginning of the century there were some 25 countries in 
Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe in different stages of implementing or adopting 
MTFs, while 10 more were considering them. The introduction of the frameworks occurred in a 
short period of time; of the existing cases in 2001, 90 percent had been implemented in the four 
previous years. In Latin America, as will be shown later, MTFs reached the region abruptly, with 
most countries implementing them in the mid part of the decade of the 2000s.   
The cornerstone of the MTFs are the macroeconomic projections (basically the forecasts 
regarding economic growth and tax revenues), which increase the transparency of fiscal policy 
and the predictability of financial flows. This information helps to establish expenditure levels 
compatible with the level of indebtedness and the resources in the economy over the medium 
term. 
The level of depth with which the MTF is promoted and the types of projections included 
determine the type of framework that is used (Oxford Policy Management, 2000).  A framework 
                                                            
2 An intermediate instrument between the two are the revolving public investment plans known as PIPs (Public 
Investment Programs) that were implemented in countries with high dependence on international assistance. The 
World Bank, one of the principal advocates of such an instrument, was the actor that supported the implementation 
of the MTFF in Africa to resolve poor budgetary outcomes that resulted from the inadequate connection between 
policies, planning, and budgeting (World Bank, 1998). 
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with a smaller number of projections is called a medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF). It is 
usually limited to establishing fiscal policy objectives and presenting a set of projections and 
comprehensive goals in respect to macroeconomic and fiscal outcomes. Usually, the central 
variable of the analysis is the evolution of the public debt with respect to gross domestic product 
(GDP). In turn, other variables are considered in relation to the construction of this variable, such 
as the evolution of expenditures and government receipts, inflation, debt, and GDP.  
Second in terms of the number of projections is the medium-term budget framework 
(MTBF or basic MTEF). This framework includes the projections in the MTF and adds medium-
term expenditure estimates for individual administrative units. The objective is to provide some 
predictability to expenditures across units that is consistent with overall fiscal discipline. The 
projections that typify this approach are those that classify expenditures by purpose-function, 
sector, or ministry.  
Finally, the medium-term expenditure framework (or expanded MTEF) is a broader 
instrument which adds elements of program and results-based budgeting. This instrument is 
supposed to increase the efficiency of public spending. The MTEF can adopt different degrees of 
detail in its expenditure projections, up to the point that all of the classifications of the annual 
budget are replicated. Table 1 shows what information is included in each of these modalities.  
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Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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The three major objectives sought by medium-term frameworks are macro-fiscal 
discipline and stability, strategic allocation of resources (allocation efficiency), and technical 
efficiency (reduce the waste of resources). Macro-fiscal stability can be classified as a macro 
level objective, while the other two can be classified as micro level objectives (UNDP, 2007).  
The MTFs can contribute to macro-fiscal discipline and stability through a number of 
channels. On the one hand, they lead to a better intertemporal management of fiscal policy. This 
occurs for two reasons. In the first place, the existence of a developed MTF makes it more 
difficult for the governments to conceal or underestimate the multi-year effect of new measures. 
Second, a well defined MTF forces the fiscal authorities to commit themselves to a predefined 
evolution of the principal aggregate public finance variables. This way, MTFs grant greater 
credibility to budget decisions and increase the transparency of the future outlook of public 
finances for all economic agents.
3  
On the other, MTFs can also have an effect on fiscal results because of their impact on 
budget institutions, which may help to reduce the impact of the “tragedy of the commons” 
problem (Ostrom, 1990). Budget institutions are the set of standards, practices, and procedures 
according to which the budgets are prepared, approved, and implemented. Budget institutions 
influence the rules of the game within which agents interact, either by imposing restrictions on 
the entire budget process, or by distributing power, responsibilities, and information among the 
different actors, therefore affecting the fiscal results (von Hagen, 1992). 
The literature has demonstrated that among the budget institutions that affect fiscal 
outcomes are numerical rules, such as limits on the deficit, the degree of hierarchy of decision-
making authority—which measures if any agency has more power in the negotiations or if the 
relationship among agencies is more collegiate—and the degree of transparency (including what 
information must be made public and the form in which this is done) (von Hagen, 1992; Alesina 
et al., 1998; von Hagen, 2006; Filc and Scartascini, 2006; Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen 
2009). The MTFs influence these dimensions in three principal ways. First, they can strengthen 
or weaken compliance with the numerical rules. Second, the mechanism used for defining goals 
may affect the degree of decision-making hierarchy (both within the national executive branch 
and among the different branches or levels of government). Finally, MTFs affect the degree of 
                                                            
3 In the absence of an MTF it is not possible to take into account the long-term results of current political and 
expenditure decisions. 
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transparency of the budget process. How much they affect each of these dimensions—and in 
what way—depends on the type of MTF.  
The number of channels are also multiple for the impact of MTFs on efficiency. MTFFs 
may affect technical and allocation efficiency by granting greater predictability to the annual 
budget cycles. MTBFs and MTEFs are aimed at improving both technical efficiency and the 
strategic allocation of expenditures because they entail a broader range of projections. Through 
better linkage between policies and expenditures, these frameworks facilitate a better allocation 
of inter- and intra-sectoral resources, provide greater budget predictability to the spending 
ministries, and encourage strategic planning within the institutions.  
The implementation of MTEFs especially improves technical efficiency because they 
facilitate oversight and control of programs and projects that take several years to be completed. 
In turn, these frameworks facilitate greater rationality in budget decisions since the changes that 
are proposed must be explained with respect to the known current budget estimates and the 
commitments made. The possibility of improving efficiency through this channel increases if the 
frameworks are integrated with a results-based budgeting system and there is in place a strong 
and able technical bureaucracy.
4 
 
Box 1.Typology of MTFs 
 
MTFs may be classified according to a set of characteristics: degree of coverage, flexibility, 
recurrence or periodicity, and detail (European Commission, 2007).  
 
•  Degree of coverage. These instruments may cover all or part of the general 
or central government. In principle, the broader their coverage, the better 
the results will be (IMF, 2001). Lower levels of coverage can work against 
both planning capacity and sustainability. Its effects on the degree of 
hierarchy of decisions are relatively direct in the vertical dimension: lower 
levels of coverage will imply less capacity of the national government to 
influence the decision-making of sub-national governments.  
                                                            
4  The impact on another potential feature of interest, representativeness, is not clearly evident. It depends both on 
whether it is a MTFF or a MTEF and on its particular design, especially the role given to the congress, the spending 
ministries, and the community stakeholders in the multiannual process.  Since the objective of the MTFFs is to 
improve fiscal results, they usually tend to concentrate decision-making power in the finance ministry, which a 
priori diminishes representativeness. The presence in the case of the MTBF and MTEF of collegiate entities in 
which sectoral ceilings are discussed has the potential to increase budget representativeness. This possibility is 
strengthened if planning is participatory and open to civil society stakeholders. 
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•  Flexibility. Flexible MTFs allow revisions of the objectives each year. By 
contrast, in fixed MTFs the most important budget objectives are set only 
once and are formulated around a projection of total expenditures that 
cannot be changed except in the case of significant shocks (for example, a 
serious recession or a change of government). By construction, the fixed 
MTFs link the annual budget with the multiannual budget.  To the extent 
that this is the case, the degree of hierarchy of decision-making increases as 
the framework more closely approaches a pure fixed model.  
•  Recurrence or periodicity. Periodic frameworks cover a finite time period 
and are not reviewed, except in emergencies, until the period is completed. 
Usually, they are linked to the government period and emphasize planning 
over the search for sustainability (similarly to the old development plans). 
Conversely, recurrent frameworks are reviewed annually.  In each review 
estimates for a new year are added. 
•  Level of detail of medium-term expenditure and income projections. The 
degree of detail of the estimates (by program, function, etc.) is what allows 
medium-term frameworks to be classified into three general types: fiscal, 
budgetary, and expenditure. 
 
 
2.2 Desirable Features in MTFs 
 
Although the objectives that can be pursued by the MTFs are common across countries, the set 
of desirable features that the frameworks should have may vary from country to country 
depending on their capacities and budgetary needs as well as the political context in which they 
are applied. Despite this, there is a common set of desirable features, which is described next.  
First, the frameworks should cover the entire general government in order to take into 
account the medium-term impact of political decisions on the budget. In some cases, sub-
national government and public enterprise expenditures represent a considerable share of total 
public spending. Thus, the possibility of forecasting the public sector’s impact on the economy 
over the medium term diminishes if they are not included. 
Second, ideally they should coordinate the actions of the national government and sub-
national governments. MTFs’ potential as a planning tool is reduced if the different government 
levels that are involved in a particular public policy sector are not included. 
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Third, medium-term fiscal goals should have a high level of political commitment to have 
credibility. Without the support of decision-makers in complying with their provisions, the 
frameworks will not be able to increase predictability or solve collective action problems. For 
example, while in the OECD countries the role of the legislative branch is essential given its 
responsibilities in the approval of the MTFs, in Latin America it does not play such an important 
role. In turn, a key factor for the credibility of the goals lies in the transparency of the projections 
(Oxford Policy Management, 2000).  
Fourth, the projections should be conservative, since an overestimation of GDP and of 
available resources to finance the expenditures of the government may create ex ante pressure to 
increase multi-year expenditure plans. This risk may be strengthened by the fact that spending 
ministers may consider the projections as a vested right, thus making it very difficult to negotiate 
reductions in expenditures later on. A possible alternative for avoiding revenue overestimations 
is the implementation of “a safety margin,” either through an automatic downward adjustment of 
the macro assumptions, or through the incorporation of contingent reserves in the budget that can 
be activated only in the event of unexpected expenditures resulting from shocks (European 
Commission, 2007). The use of prudent factors is being applied in countries such as Canada and 
the Netherlands. In the case of Canada, the projections are based on an exercise with the private 
sector consisting of subtracting an amount allocated to a contingency fund and an amount 
stipulated by a factor of economic prudence to the average projections of the private sector. The 
annual budget process must be strongly related to the medium-term frameworks in such a way 
that the multi-year goals set in these frameworks become the basis from which the budget is 
prepared.  
Moreover, although expenditure projections should not be regarded as vested rights by 
the different agencies (Holmes and Evans, 2003), the MTF must have a clear link with the annual 
process. That is, while the annual budget should not be automatically prepared based on the 
multiannual budget, the latter should really be taken into account when preparing the former. The 
objective of the projections in the frameworks is to establish a series of possibilities given the 
existing and potential policies and the estimated macroeconomic context. Under appropriate 
conditions, these can become the baseline for a new programming period (Allen and Tommasi, 
2001). Unlike what is observed in the case of a multiyear budget such as the five-year budget of 
Uruguay, MTFs preserve the annual budget system. By not establishing legal obligations for the 
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future, the projections have enough flexibility to be adapted in response to a changing economic 
environment (Moreno, 2005).  
Finally, there should be virtuous feedback between the MTFs and the political process of 
formulating the budget. On the one hand, the proper operation of MTFs depends on finance 
ministries’ regarding them as a fundamental tool and promoting their use and management in the 
spending ministries, particularly by those ministries’ political directors. This, in turn, requires 
that the spending ministers see some benefit in using the framework. Budget reforms are 
sustainable only if the key actors that participate in the process can observe their benefits fairly 
quickly.  In this case, one of the most obvious benefits for the spending ministers is the increase 
in the predictability of the flow of funds (Oxford Policy Management, 2000).  
After identifying the desirable characteristics of the frameworks, it is useful to compare 
them with other similar instruments, such as “development plans.” These plans, used by many 
developing countries during the 1960s and 1970s, consisted of four to six-year plans aimed at 
defining and implementing medium-term economic and social objectives. However, the fact that 
they had fixed time horizons and were prepared in each government period often made them not 
very realistic and not sufficiently flexible to incorporate changes into the economic framework. 
Thus the assumed perspective was static, valid for just a specific period, and usually defined 
outside the budget process, without much commitment in terms of fiscal discipline (Schiavo-
Campo and Tommasi, 1999). On the other hand, MTFs are supposed to involve a continuous, 
encompassing, and disciplined process that promotes the review of the prioritization of 
expenditures in the context of a dynamic of evaluation, adjustment, and constant updating of 
projections and information on expenditures and acting on that information.  
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Box 2. Stages in the Development of the MTFs 
 
In order for medium-term frameworks to gain the support and compliance of those who make 
policies, their development should include opportunities for interaction between the leading unit 
of the expenditure framework and the executing units to promote coordination between planning 
and budgeting. Thus, their design has to be based in stages that combine the determination of the 
ceilings “from the top down” and the establishment of priorities “from the bottom up.” 
According to Le Houerou and Talercio (2002), the stages can be characterized as follows:  
 
•  Stage 1. Development of a macroeconomic/fiscal framework: designed based 
on a model that makes medium-term income and expenditures projections.  
•  Stage 2. Development of sectoral programs: agreements are reached 
concerning sector objectives, products, and activities. Existing programs are 
reviewed and new ones are developed. The cost of the programs is estimated.  
•  Stage 3. Development of sectoral expenditure frameworks: inter and intra-
sectoral trade-offs. Consensus development concerning strategic allocation of 
resources.  
•  Stage 4. Definition of sectoral allocation of resources: determination of 
medium-term sectoral budget ceilings (approved by the cabinet).  
•  Stage 5. Preparation of sectoral budgets: medium-term sectoral programs 
based on the budget ceilings.  
•  Stage 6. Final political approval: presentation of budget estimations to the 
cabinet and parliament for approval.  
 
 
3. The Experience of the Developed Countries 
 
Multiannual budgeting mechanisms in the developed countries are long-standing. The 
implementation of programming processes and medium-term expenditure projections started in 
OECD member countries between the 1960s and 1970s. Some illustrative cases are those of 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Australia. In Germany, in 1969, the Budget Principles Law 
mandated that the federal government carry out a multiannual framework. In the United 
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Kingdom, since 1980 there has been a multiannual framework called the Medium-Term 
Financing Strategy. In Australia, after a failed attempt in the 1970s, one of the most successful 
MTFs was implemented in 1982.  
Although at first these tools were aimed at identifying policy alternatives and their 
financing, this situation changed in the mid-1980s. In a scenario in which the medium-term 
projections reflected a list of needs based on different sectoral interests, changes in the economic 
context forced a rethinking of the use of the MTF. From this moment on, it began to be used to 
gain control of future expenditures (Allen and Tommasi, 2001).  
  The adoption of fiscal goals within the framework of the Maastricht Treaty gave a new 
impetus to this tool in the countries belonging to the European Union since it was believed that 
an adequate MTF could facilitate compliance with the budget goals required for compliance with 
the treaty. In this context, it is not surprising that, as shown in Table 2, there are few countries 
within the European Union that do not have a medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF).  
  The frameworks adopted by the countries belonging to the European Union have many 
points in common in their design. Most of them place an emphasis on transparency, their time 
horizon is similar, and they are reviewed every year (Table 3). The differences are more notable 
in the degree of coverage. In 14 countries, the framework totally covers the general government. 
In the Netherlands and Sweden, the MTEF covers the central government and social security. In 
Ireland, it covers the central government and local governments, while in the remaining three it 
covers only the central government (Table 2).  
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Czech Republic X X  
Romania X
Sweden X X
14  3361 65 1   1
When are medium‐term budgetary objectives 
established and  reviewed? Framework Coverage 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from the European Commission (2007).  
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with  basis Other      
Germany 4 X       
Austria 4 X       
Belgium  4   
Bulgaria  3 X      
Cyprus No MTEF    
Denmark   4 X     
Slovakia  3 X      
Slovenia  3 X      
Spain 3 X      
Estonia 4 X       
Finland    4 X    
France  3 X      
Greece  No MTEF   
Netherlands  4 X      
Hungary    No MTEF 
Ireland  5  X 
Italy     3  X 
Latvia   5  X 
Lithuania  2  X 
Luxemburg     No MTEF 
Malta   3  X 
Poland     3  X 
Portugal   No MTEF 
United Kingdom  Other  X 
Czech Republic  3  X 
Romania     No MTEF 
Sweden     3  X 
6  13  1    
How are multiannual goals   
incorporated into the budget   
formulation? 
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4. The Situation in Latin America 
 
The experience in Latin America is more recent. Various countries implemented MTFF at the 
beginning of this decade, in many cases accompanied by fiscal responsibility laws (Filc and 
Scartascini, 2007). In this region, unlike what is observed in Africa, the panorama is not only 
heterogeneous with respect to the degree of depth of the medium-term fiscal frameworks, but 
also displays differences in the focus of the multiannual approach adopted. That is, there are not 
only cases in which MTFF or MTEF have been adopted, but differences are observed concerning 
their relationship to the annual budget, as in the Uruguayan case, or in regard to dynamic by 
which it is updated, as in the cases of Brazil, Venezuela, and Uruguay. It should be noted that the 
Uruguayan case is not only unique in this regard, but is also one of the first developing counties 
to have adopted the MTF.  
The differences in the degree of depth (the first dimension of classification) can be 
observed in Table 4.  





























1 333 3 3 3 3 33
Bolivia 222 2 2 2 2 22
Brazil 333 3 3 3 3 33
Colombia 333 3 3 3 2 22
Costa Rica 222 2 2 2 2 22
Chile
2 333 3 2 2 3 22
Dominican Rep. 222 2 2 2 2 22
Ecuador 222 2 2 2 2 23
El Salvador 222 2 2 2 2 22
Guatemala 333 3 3 2 3 22
Nicaragua 333 3 3 3 3 33
Mexico
2 333 3 2 2 3 22
Honduras 333 3 3 3 3 32
Panama 222 2 2 2 2 22
Paraguay 333 3 3 3 2 22
Peru
3 5 333 3 2 2 2 22
Uruguay 333 3 3 3 3 22












Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
                                                            
5 The data are provided in Stata format and available for download at http://www.iadb.org/research/statistics.cfm?lang=en  
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Below, the characteristics of the frameworks are explored in greater detail, country by 
country. The order used is the degree of depth of implementation, depending on whether they 
have a MTFF, MTBF, or MTEF.
6   
A first group are those countries that have implemented the MTFF in its most basic form. 
That is, they have multiannual information in respect to macroeconomic variables.  
In Chile, based on the reform of the Financial Management Law, the Ministry of Finance 
was mandated to develop a medium-term fiscal framework. Currently, a financial projection of 
the public sector for a period of four years is presented in the draft legislation of Public Sector 
Budgets prepared by the Finance Ministry, which has been made public since 2000. It includes 
macroeconomic
7 assumptions,
 income classified as budgetary and extra-budgetary, and lastly, 
expenditures, also classified as budgetary and extra-budgetary. Finally, it presents the projection 
of the budget balance of the consolidated central government, which incorporates the provision 
for the fulfillment of the goal of obtaining a structural fiscal surplus of 0.5 percent of GDP. The 
coverage of this framework encompasses the consolidated central government. Its objective is 
basically related with anticipating allowances or restrictions with current legislation and 
commitments in order to adopt preventive measures that allow expenditure levels compatible 
with fiscal policy rules to be maintained. It is prepared in a revolving annual time horizon.  
In Peru, the multiannual macroeconomic framework is framed within the scheme 
established in the Fiscal Responsibility and Transparency Law approved in 2000. The goal is to 
increase transparency as well as to frame the budget within the economic policy of the 
government. Budgetary and non-budgetary expenditures and income projections are included. At 
the same time, it presents projections for macroeconomic variables as well as for fiscal results. 
Both the limited scheme and its relation to the Fiscal Responsibility Law establish a scenario in 
which the framework is oriented toward facilitating compliance with the fiscal rule.  
                                                            
6 For the preparation of this section the following sources were used, among others: Surveys of Open Budget 
Initiative (2006); Organic Law of Budgetary System of Venezuela; Organic Law of the Financial Management of 
the Public Sector; United Nations Development Program (UNDP), (2007); Resolution No. 616 of the Ministry of 
Finance of Paraguay; Organic Law of Fiscal Responsibility, Stabilization, and Transparency of Ecuador; Public 
Finance Report: Draft legislation of Public Sector Budgets 2008 of Chile;  Shack (2008);  Law of Fiscal 
Responsibility of Brazil; Pares (2007); Federal System of Fiscal Responsibility of Argentina; Law of Fiscal 
Solvency of Argentina; Multi-Year Macroeconomic Frameworks of Peru; Medium-term Expenditure Frameworks of 
Colombia; Medium-term Fiscal Frameworks of Colombia; Law of Fiscal Responsibility of Colombia; General 
Criteria for Economic Policy (2008) of Mexico; Multiannual Plan of Brazil; Medium-term Budgetary Framework of 
Nicaragua; Multiannual Budget of Honduras; Multiannual Budget of Guatemala. 
7 GDP (real variation rate and GDP growth trend); real variation rate of internal demand; inflation; exchange rate; 
copper price; molybdenum price. 
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The case of Ecuador is unique and difficult to classify. The institutions submit an 
Institutional Multiannual Plan (IMP) in which the multiannual budget for different activities 
must be included. However, as in the Peruvian case, they are not part of a comprehensive and 
consolidated medium-term budgeting system. These plans include the description of the vision 
and mission of the institution as well as its functions and principal operations. The multiannual 
plans for the different institutions must be framed within the multiannual plan of the national 
government.  
This multiannual plan, which is considered static because it is not recalculated with the 
same time horizon each year, since this coincides with the beginning of the presidential term, 
establishes the objectives and the medium-term strategic goals. This document, which is 
submitted to the congress, does not specify a financing dimension establishing the needs for 
medium-term expenditure even though its purpose is to guide expenditure and public investment 
decisions (Organic Law of Fiscal Responsibility, Stabilization, and Transparency, approved in 
2002). It should be noted that the monitoring of the multiannual plan of the government and of 
the budget is carried out by different entities.  
In Mexico, since 2002, the multiannual framework has been presented in the rationale for 
the Draft Budget Law as the evolution of the economy and of public finances in the medium 
term or a time period of six years. It includes projections of macroeconomic variables,
8 of budget 
revenues classified as oil-related or other, of expenditures broken down into the categories 
salaries and wages, pensions, subsidies and transfers, and capital expenditure. Finally, the 
framework includes projections of the economic balance and the net debt. It should be pointed 
out that, unlike other cases, expenditures are not presented as current values but as a share of 
GDP.  
Forecasts of economic and GDP growth, as well as the financial requirements of the 
public sector are developed in the General Criteria for Economic Policy (also as a percentage of 
GDP). Only for certain expenditure categories and investment expenditure were multi-year 
forecasts provided as established in the law following approval of the Finance Reform.  
According to its regulatory framework, the MTF in Venezuela combines characteristics 
related to fiscal stability and to planning. Introduced in 2000, the Multiannual Budget 
                                                            
8 Real variation of GDP, inflation, interest rates, the current account, aggregate supply (GDP and imports), aggregate 
demand (consumption, gross capital formation and exports). 
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Framework (MBF) has a fixed horizon of three years that does not coincide with the presidential 
period.
9 This document is prepared through the joint effort of the Ministry of Finance, the 
Ministry of Planning and Development, and the Central Bank. The MBF includes economic 
policy objectives, medium-term macroeconomic assumptions, limits of expenditure and 
indebtedness for the annual budgets of the period, long-term fiscal policy objectives, and the 
general guidelines for the formulation of the budget. According to the regulatory framework 
(Constitution and Organic Law of the Budget Financial Management), the macro-fiscal rules are 
directly related to the medium-term fiscal framework, while they are defined with respect to the 
period of effectiveness of the multiannual budget framework.  
A second group of countries promoted medium-term budgetary frameworks (MTBF). 
This limited version of the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF), also presents 
projections for expenditure by function or economic classification.  
In Guatemala, a multiannual budget has been included in the budgetary documents 
submitted to Congress since 2003.  In 2006, a strategic vision was incorporated that takes into 
account the medium-term goals drafted by the ministries in their multi-year plans. The 
Multiannual Budget (MB) is included in compliance with the Organic Law of the Budget. The 
MB contains estimations of the revenue and expenditure fiscal aggregates for the following three 
years. The document, prepared by the Ministry of Finance of Guatemala, includes projections of 
the institutional and sectoral expenditures (a classification which differs from the classical 
functional classification), GDP, inflation, exports and imports, and revenues classified by type of 
tax.  
According to the current regulatory framework, the preparation process is divided into 
two stages. During the first stage, the medium-term macroeconomic framework that serves as the 
basis for the revenue estimation and expenditure ceilings for the period is defined. In the second 
stage, the administrative entities formulate their respective provisional drafts of the multiannual 
budget based on their allocated expenditure limits.  
Since 2006, Colombia also has had a MTBF with a revolving horizon of four years. 
Along with the medium-term expenditure framework presented with the Draft Budget 
                                                            
9 The national executive branch, through the Minister of Finance, will present to the National Assembly the draft 
legislation of the multiannual budget framework, before July 15 of the first and the fourth year of the constitutional 
period of the Presidency of the Republic, and this will be approved before August 15 of the same year of its 
presentation. 
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Legislation, projections of fiscal balances, expenditure ceilings by administrative unit, and an 
explanation of the differences relative to the previous medium-term expenditure framework are 
published.  
The last group of countries opted for the broader MTEF scheme in which expenditure 
projections by program are also included.  
In Nicaragua, starting in 2006, a medium-term budget framework has been prepared that 
covers various macroeconomic aggregates and the consolidated operations of the public sector 
and of the principal government agencies in a revolving horizon of three years. Pursuant to what 
is stipulated in the Law of Financial Management and Budget Regime, the formulation, approval, 
and execution of the budget must be linked to the National Development Plan (NDP), the 
medium-term budget framework, and the Public Investments Program, among other policy 
instruments. Included in the MTBF are macroeconomic aggregates and consolidated operations 
of the public sector and of the principal government agencies.  
The medium-term expenditure framework of Brazil, formally introduced in 2000, is 
probably the most developed and stands out as well for the predominant role that planning plays. 
The budget of the federal government that is effective for one year is formally linked with the 
planning system which comprises four years, known as Plano Brasil.  This plan is approved by 
law at the beginning of each presidential period. The instrument that bridges the plan and the 
annual budget is called Budget Directives, which is a law that is passed for each new fiscal year.  
In the Brazilian budget context there are, thus, three planning horizons. The first is a 
long-term indicative stage (eight years). Next is a programming stage that entails the preparation 
of the four-year multiannual budget (MB) in which the allocation of budget resources is defined 
by programs and activities in accordance with the goals of the government. Revenue projections, 
macroeconomic variables, and fiscal results are also established in this framework (estimations 
for sub-national governments are also included), in addition to the annual budget. 
Some characteristics of the MB differ from the traditional MTF, which reveals an attempt 
to link planning to budgeting. The classification of financing is clearly focused on the programs 
and their goals. The global amount is consistent with the revenue projections and the fiscal goals 
for the period (for example, in MB 2004-2007 the goal was to maintain a primary surplus of 4.25 
percent of GDP each year). The aim to address planning is clear in that programs are classified 
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under macro-objectives and these, in turn, are categorized into mega-objectives within a 
hierarchical framework.  
However, the ambitious approach to integrate plans and budgets under the orbit of the 
Ministry of Planning, has yet to yield all of the expected results. With respect to fiscal prudence 
in particular, the results of the Brazilian experience have not been as successful as expected 
(Gómez and Martínez-Vázquez, 2008).  
In Paraguay, a presidential decree in 2006 granted the ministry of finance the task of 
formulating the Referential Multiannual Budget. This multiannual budget has a revolving 
horizon of three years and encompasses the general government. The document includes revenue 
and expenditure projections as a percentage of GDP within the scheme of savings-investment-
financing, macroeconomic variables (GDP, inflation, and exchange rate), and expenditure by 
function, institution, and broad social goals.  
In Honduras, as in Nicaragua, the influence of the Poverty Reduction Strategy and 
international assistance associated with it laid the foundation for the implementation of an 
MTEF. As a result, since 2003 the budget proposal sent by the executive branch to the congress 
includes an annex with a multi-year budget with information on the evolution of fiscal 
aggregates in the following three years. Although it includes not only macro projections but also 
expenditures by program projections, to date, this budget has consisted basically of a projection 
of the data of the base year for the fiscal year and three more years based on certain assumptions 
regarding the trends of specific expenditure categories (Acevedo, 2007).  
Argentina has a three-year multiannual framework with a revolving time horizon that 
covers general administration, decentralized entities and trust funds but does not mandate 
actions; it is intended mainly as an information tool. It should be pointed out that most social 
spending is executed by the provinces, particularly education and health, and consequently is left 
out. The multi-year budget includes projections of macroeconomic variables, revenues, 
expenditures by objective and function, expenditures by administrative unit, and expenditures by 
program.  
Although the regular budget in Uruguay is multiannual in nature, clarification is 
necessary. Its five-year budget coincides with the presidential term and does not have a 
specifically annual counterpart, thus differing from the large majority of MTFF experiences. In 
the first place, this particular scheme implies that it must be approved by the congress. Secondly, 
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unlike other cases observed in Latin America, compliance is compulsory. However, the budget 
can be modified. After one year, the record of budget execution is reported and a series of 
modifications are presented to the congress, which are subject to its approval. Since the MTEF is 
not considered to be a multiannual budgeting system that establishes legally binding expenditure 
allocations stretching out for several years, the multiannual budget in Uruguay would not be 
considered an MTEF.  
The government of Costa Rica presented a MTEF for the first time for the 2008-2010 
period containing projections for a three-year revolving horizon of the principal revenue and 
expenditure categories of the budget. The multiannual budget is proposed as a guide for the 
medium-term fiscal policy of the state and is a frame of reference for the annual budget and the 
public investment plan.  
Among the remaining countries, the Dominican Republic and Panama have already 
developed the legal framework that will guide the implementation of medium-term fiscal 
frameworks.  
  In the case of the Dominican Republic, in accordance with the Organic Law for the 
Public Sector Budget promulgated in 2006, during 2008 work was carried out to prepare a four-
year multiannual budget for the non-financial public sector. The strategic guidelines of the 
Multiannual National Plan of the Public Sector must be consistent with the financial framework 
prepared by the Ministry of Finance for the same period. Although this medium-term framework 
will only be of an informative nature, the decree approved in 2007, which governs the Planning 
and Public Investment Law, calls upon the Governing Council to be knowledgeable about, 
debate, and make decisions in relation to this multiannual budget.  
  Panama is on the verge of approving an MTFF. In April 2008, the Finance, Planning, and 
Economic Policy Commission presented to the Plenary of the National Assembly the Draft 
Legislation of Fiscal Social Responsibility. This law has the characteristics of a fiscal 
responsibility law in which an MTFF is included. The draft legislation defines the compulsory 
nature of presenting a Government Strategic Plan at the beginning of each administration, which 
must include the Economic and Social Strategy, the five-year Financial Program, and the Public 
Investments Indicative Plan. The law covers all the entities of the public sector. Since this task is 
carried out at the beginning of each administration, the MTFF coincides with the government period 
and, as a result, has a fixed time horizon. The amendments to the Strategic Plan must be approved 
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by the Cabinet Council. The macroeconomic assumptions will include, at least, the following 
variables: the rate of growth of GDP and annual inflation, measured by the Consumer Price 
Index; revenue and expenditure projections of the non-financial public sector; amount of public 
investment, and expected changes in the public debt level. The special feature of the Panamanian 
draft legislation is that the medium-term fiscal framework must contain, at the very least, a 
comparison of the programmed fiscal goals against the results achieved and, in case of 
noncompliance with the expected goals, a detailed explanation of the reason or reasons for the 
noncompliance and the magnitude of the necessary fiscal adjustment to resume compliance with 
the fiscal goals.  
 
5. Case Studies: Colombia, Peru, and Argentina 
 
Understanding how MTFs are working in LAC requires in-depth understanding of the conditions 
of implementation and their characteristics, as well as the fullest possible analysis of whether  
they are fulfilling their objectives. This section describes the MTFs in three countries and 
analyzes their effects on the budget process. The cases have been selected so that each of the 
different MTF types is covered. 
 




The MTEF was introduced in Colombia at the time it passed its Fiscal Responsibility Law. After 
the fiscal crisis of the 1990s, Colombia reached an agreement with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to implement various economic adjustments in expenditures, pensions, and fiscal 
rules. Among the last rules adopted within the framework of the fiscal responsibility law were 
the fiscal and medium-term expenditure frameworks.  
The Medium-Term Fiscal Framework has a time horizon of ten years and a fundamental 
objective to reduce, and increase the sustainability of, the public debt. To this end, it sets primary 
surplus goals in line with the debt goals and establishes GDP and revenue collection projections 
that determine expenditure ceilings. The goal that guides the MTFF is to reach a net debt level of 
25 percent of GDP by 2018. In order to achieve this, a surplus of 2.5 percent is considered 
necessary, with GDP growth of 4.5 percent.  
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During the drafting of this document the macro discussion takes place, estimating the 
adjustments needed that are consistent with meeting the goal, taking into account inflation, 
unemployment, growth (productivity), and investment projections. The framework is prepared 
jointly by the Ministry of Finance and the National Planning Directorate which represents the 
sectors.  
Preparation of the MTEF began in 2006.  It has a time horizon of three years, is recurrent 
and sets expenditure goals for the different sectors.  In its preparation the primary surplus goals 
of the MTFF, as well as the data produced within each entity, are taken into account. This 
document provides the context for the budget discussion in respect to the spending under 
execution and compulsory transfers (for example, those stipulated in the Constitution) and debt 
service, which is a significant, rigid portion of the budget. It should be noted that the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law establishes firm restrictions on increasing current expenditures (with the 
exception of certain sectors, such as the Armed Forces, the Office of the Comptroller, and 
Audit). The rest of the discussion deals with the investment expenditure framework.  
However, these are not the only medium-term planning instruments. There is a 
Government Plan that establishes sectoral goals for the presidential term. The sectors and the 
National Planning Directorate participate in establishing these goals, but the Ministry of Finance 
does not participate. The Government Plan has a financing section that encompasses all expenses 
that are not operational in nature (taking into account the MTFF) and a programming section. It 
includes sectoral plans prepared by each ministry. These sectoral plans must be adapted to the 
conditions imposed by three different processes: the Government Plan, the MTEF, and the long-
term Sectoral Plans that have a 10-year horizon. The latter establish general goals without 
including a financing facet. A noteworthy characteristic is that its preparation is the result of a 
collective process in which different sectoral actors participate (for example, those in education,  
unions, universities, NGOs, and political parties). The existence of various parallel medium-term 
frameworks is not the only element of originality exhibited by the Colombian case. The budget is 
articulated on the basis of a classification that does not coincide with the notion of capital and 
current expenditure. On the one hand, the Ministry of Finance manages three quarters of the 
budget. This portion includes part of the current and operational expenditures such as acquisition 
of equipment, maintenance, and personnel, as well as debt service. On the other hand, the 
National Planning Directorate manages investment spending, including that related to education 
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programs, as well as health subsidies, military expenditure, fixed capital, and transfers to sub-
national entities.  
First, a medium-term budget programming circular is sent to the ministries with sectoral 
ceilings approved by the cabinet. Based on this circular, the sectors review their medium-term 
programs. Subsequently, the sectors submit a financing request that must be accompanied by an 
adjustment in the goals (although formally there is no direct linkage) if it surpasses the ceiling. 
At this time, the first filter for adapting the requests from the sectors to the MTEF is set in 
motion. Technical groups from the Ministry of Finance, the National Planning Directorate, and 
the different sectors meet to reconcile the financing requests.  
The second filter consists of bilateral discussions between the Ministers of Finance and 
Planning, on the one hand, with the ministers of each sector, on the other. In this stage, an 
attempt is made to structure policy and program priorities. Finally, this is discussed again in the 
cabinet. At this point, the sectors typically gain strength. Usually the president supports the 
expenditure ministers particularly in certain strategic areas that he/she prioritizes, such as 
education. To this end, the ministers put in play the achievement of the goals of the development 
plan.  
It should be pointed out that throughout this process the Congress does not have the 
power to interfere. In fact, the MTEF and the MTFF are sent to the legislators for information 
purposes only, given that it does not have the power to modify or veto them.  
What are the prevailing perceptions of the quality and timeliness of the statistical 
information? The feeling one is left with is that the accounting system at the sub-national level is 
quite inefficient as well as the statistics. Also, according to the sources interviewed, there are 
deficiencies in the information “below the line” (for example, in the calculation of the pension 




As can be observed in Table 5, the macroeconomic projections of both GDP and inflation have 
been fairly accurate. The expenditure projections by sector were incorporated in 2007, which 
means that it is too early to evaluate them.  
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Source: Authors’ compilation based on the medium-term fiscal frameworks, Ministry of Finance 
and Public Credit and National Administrative Statistics Department, Colombia.  
5.1.3 The Budget Process 
 
The implementation of the medium-term fiscal and expenditure frameworks has generated 
changes in the budget process. It should be noted that the MTEF period of operation has been too 
limited to consider the effects observed as institutional changes that have become consolidated.  
A first achievement was for the process of adjusting expenditure to budget constraints to 
be done with greater involvement of the sectors. This does not imply that the ceilings are 
necessarily agreed upon. Before the adoption of the framework, the pressure to comply with 
expenditure limits fell on the Ministry of Finance which led, in some cases, to arbitrary cuts. 
This change in the budget dynamic is also expressed in the fact that, previously, the sectors 
tended to develop “inflated” provisional budget proposals in order to prevent cuts from the 
Ministry of Finance. This trend was reduced with the multiannual perspective.  
The improvement in the predictability of the allocation of funds also had positive effects. 
The resources that were previously assigned but not delivered have been reduced. This is due to 
the fact that previously the entities preferred to ensure funds even though they did not have plans 
on how to spend them. According to the interviewees, without the MTEF the budget became 
institutional plunder: since no entity had guaranteed financing in the future, each entity sought to 
obtain as much as possible every year. The MTEF made it possible to view a time horizon 
beyond one year and to begin to prioritize and program for the medium term. However, there are 
factors outside of this process that can alter both planning and budgeting. Among them are laws 
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passed by Congress that require investments to be made and judicial rulings. It should be pointed 
out that these two powers are excluded from the MTEF.  
In turn, certain characteristics of the budget process and of the policymaking process 
prevent the MTEF from functioning with all of its potential, particularly the conflict between the 
national government and subnational governments. The principal reason is the decision of the 
central government to assume traditional functions of the subnational governments, such as 
water supply systems and roads. This competition between the different levels generates negative 
incentives that are aggravated because the periods of government and the plans do not coincide 
at the national and subnational levels.
10  
 
5.1.4 Conclusions about the Colombian Case 
 
In addition to the previously mentioned effects on the budget decision-making process, the 
actors’ perceptions are that the MTFs have demonstrated various positive effects. The MTFF has 
served as a reference for generating fiscal discipline, made the different actors aware of fiscal 
restrictions, and made budget discussions more transparent. This is observed in the fact that even 
though there is no formal relationship between the Government Plan and the MTFF, during 
preparation of the former the restrictions imposed by the latter are taken into account.  
The problems of expenditure efficiency related to results-based budgeting are an issue 
that the MTEF has not addressed. This is due mainly to the fact that a scheme has been chosen 
that is limited to the operating environment. However, this process has influenced the efficiency 
of expenditures. First, based on what is perceived by the sectors, the MTEF increased 
predictability and facilitated the flow of certain processes that implied a time horizon that is 
longer than the annual one. This perception is shared by high-ranking officials in the ministries.  
In this regard, the MTEF also improved the availability of statistical information. The task of 
establishing goals purified the baselines, although monitoring indicates problems related to 
delays in the production of the information.  
Furthermore, there are certain pending issues. For example, the effect of the MTEF on 
the reduction of the inertial nature of the budget is relative. This is explained to a great extent by 
the rigidity resulting from earmarking and the expenditures by function and the debt. In regard to 
                                                            
10 One issue that remains to be evaluated is what will happen when an administration has to work with the MTEF 
approved by a previous government. 
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investment spending, according to the sources consulted, the MTEF has helped make 
expenditures flexible and, as a result, reduces their inertial nature.  
In the Colombian case, although the main objective of introducing the frameworks was to 
gradually reduce the public debt, elements that were incorporated aimed at favoring planning 
based on the participation of the spending ministers in the process. Nonetheless, there remain 
weaknesses related to planning capacity. One of the main flaws is that in practice it is difficult to 
reach the municipal level, although the latter plays a relevant role in the execution of public 
policies.  
 




As in Colombia, the MTFF was instituted in Peru as part of a series of reforms of the budget 
process contained in the Fiscal Responsibility Law. This framework, known as the Medium-
Term Macroeconomic Framework (MTMF) was adopted in 2000; it has a revolving time horizon 
of three years and is prepared for the general government. Its main objective is to adapt the 
expenditures and the evolution of the debt to the fiscal rules.  
The document is prepared by the General Directorate of Economic and Social Affairs 
(DGAEyS, in Spanish) under the Ministry of Economy and Finance. This unit is responsible for 
guiding and coordinating the formulation, execution, monitoring, and evaluation of short, 
medium, and long-term economic and social policies, as well as the Economic Program. It 
should be pointed out that this entity is not in charge of the annual budget. The Public Budget 
National Directorate is responsible for the National Budget System and prepares the provisional 
draft of the Annual Budget Law.  
To develop the MTMF, the DGAEyS uses historical budgeting of total expenditures plus 
a given additional percentage. This procedure holds two major implications: first, that the 
methodology has incremental characteristics, and second, that the planning done by the line 
ministries is not taken into account in the calculation of the ceiling established in the MTMF. 
Thus, the MTMF ends up being almost exclusively a restriction on expenditures and not a 
programming tool.  
Indeed, different administrative units do not participate as sectors in the preparation of 
the macro framework. What does take place is that the historical expenditures are used as an 
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input to calculate the ceiling for total expenditures. However, the sectors provide information to 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The administrative units provide information concerning 
indebtedness and debt service payments to adapt to the fiscal rules.  
Furthermore, there is an information flow in the opposite direction. The MTMF gives the 
sectors reference ceilings both for planning the subsequent years and for the annual period. It 
allows them to relate the variable projections such as GDP, total income and total expenditures to 
the historical allocation of the sector to predict certain tentative expenditure levels.  
The resulting document is reviewed by the Central Bank. After responding to the 
comments that may have been made, it is submitted to the Cabinet (Council of Ministers) for its 
approval. The final document is sent to Congress one month before the annual budget goes to 
committee since the macroeconomic framework serves as the basis for the budget debate. Given 
that the Medium-Term Macroeconomic Framework is only submitted for information purposes, 
Congress usually does not discuss it. However, there have been occasions on which certain 
specific aspects of the projections, such as those related to the exchange rate, have been subject 
to debate.  
Although there is no medium-term expenditure framework, the different sectors carry out 
a planning exercise, which is incorporated into the Medium-Term Sectoral Plans. These 
documents are basically, a medium-term management tool. Although they have a financing 
section, they do not necessarily bear a direct relation to the macroeconomic framework but use it 
as an input. These four-year sectoral plans coincide with the government term of office and are 
annually evaluated.  
In turn, for some sectors such as education and health, these sectoral plans are framed as 
a part of national plans that establish long-term goals for the year 2020. Unlike the sectoral plans, 
the latter do not have a financial component. This is not the only difference between long-term 
and medium-term plans. Long-term plans are prepared through a more inclusive process, with 
sectoral stakeholders invited to participate during their development.  
In addition to these initiatives within the sectors, the ministry of Economy and Finance 
has undertaken some steps to strengthen the MTFF. The first of its initiatives—to establish 
multiannual budgets for investment projects—was carried out through the reform of the National 
Public Investment System Law No. 27,293.  Since multi-year investment budgets are extended at 
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the administrative unit level, the know-how and the necessary information for taking this step are 
available.  
Another initiative is the preparation of a social macroeconomic framework. This recently 
launched instrument is aimed at defining sectoral goals. Although it has a financial component, 
not all of those responsible for sectoral budget management participate in its preparation. The 
objective of this initiative, which is led by the cabinet, is to reorient social programs toward 
reducing poverty levels. It should be pointed out that Congress is not involved in this initiative.  
The social macroeconomic framework is, in turn, accompanied by the introduction of 
other budgeting techniques. In 2006, a pilot was begun of results-based programs in five sectors 
(among the programs included in this initiative are those focused on nutrition, maternal-neonatal 
health care, and student achievement). These programs, which are considered strategic, are 
evaluated on a quarterly basis in terms of their achievement of physical goals and results. Five 
strategic programs in results-based programming were initiated this year.  
In order for undertakings such as multiannual frameworks or programs with results-based 
budgeting to work, adequate statistical information needs be available. The different sectors have 
a negative perception of the statistical data available. Serious problems are evident with respect 
the quality of the data and there are numerous gaps. Due to the lack of coordination with the 




As can be observed in Table 6, the projections for GDP growth are moderate. This difference is 
associated with greater expenditures and surpluses than projected.  
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Source: Authors’ compilation based on medium-term macroeconomic frameworks (2004-2008), Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, Peru.  
 
5.2.3 The Budget Process 
 
The Medium-Term Macroeconomic Framework is not an area of public policy discussion. In 
practice, the sequence that determines the ceilings is as follows: projection of GDP into the 
future, calculation of income and, finally, the projection of expenditure levels consistent with the 
compliance with fiscal rules. As mentioned earlier, within an analysis based on the 
sustainability-planning dichotomy, the MTF in Peru is oriented toward sustainability.  
Within this scheme, it is consistent for the DGAEyS to attempt to prepare a moderate 
macro framework. Since one of the functions pursued is to restrict expenditure requests from the 
sectors, it tries to be conservative in its projections. Such practices have not generated complaints 
among the ministers. Thus, the ceilings established by the DGAEyS are usually approved 
without modification by the Cabinet.  
This does not imply that the sectors lack a space in which to discuss the financing of 
public policies. The annual budget process is where this discussion takes place. According to the 
opinions of those interviewed, the allocation of budget limits stipulated by the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance,  usually does not meet the budget needs of the sectors. As a result, 
additional demands are added to the ceiling amounts. The probability of getting those additional 
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funds depends to a great extent on the political weight of the head of the administrative unit 
during the discussion of the budget in the Council of Ministers.  
During the annual budget process the lack of coordination between the sectoral plans and 
the budget comes to light. At times, this situation leads to conflicts between the spending 
ministries and the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which is perceived as an obstacle to its 
own ability to implement policies. Since the goals are established in the sectoral medium and 
long-term plans while the allocation of resources is determined, ultimately by the ministry of 
Economy and Finance, such inconsistency results in noncompliance with the established goals. 
All these conflicts could be resolved through the strengthening of the fiscal framework in an 
MTEF.  
However, as previously seen, it is not necessarily sufficient to establish an MTEF to 
obtain coordination between planning and budgeting. In the case of Peru, there are other features 
of the political dynamic that should be controlled. For example, sectoral plans tend to be 
reviewed with each management change. Since rotation of ministers is important, planning loses 
most of its raison d’être.  
The other factor of the political process that generates problems in planning and that 
should be taken into account at the time of designing an MTEF is the relationship between 
different levels of government. Currently there are coordination problems between the sectors at 
the national level and the regions. Although sectoral goals are established by the national 
ministries, the regional authorities in charge of executing the expenditures enjoy a high level of 
discretion in reassigning the expenditure among functions. As a result, an MTEF should include 
the participation of sub-national actors that allow management agreements to be reached that 
imply a commitment to carry out the actions aimed at reaching the goals.  
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5.2.4 Conclusions for Peru 
 
As currently developed, the MTFF in Peru prioritizes those instruments related to the pursuit of 
macroeconomic stability over those that would strengthen the planning aspect of the MTF. This 
results from the fact that the MTF does not include programming or functional categories.
11  This 
functional design for compliance with the fiscal rules also has effects on the distribution of the 
power of the actors. By not establishing consensus-based mechanisms in the preparation of the 
ceilings, this framework tends to concentrate budget decision-making power in the MEF.  
In addition to affecting the powers of the actors, the MTFF affects the results of budget 
policy. Although the effects on sustainability are positive, they are probably negligible or 
strengthen the preexisting dynamics in respect to efficiency and representativeness. With respect 
to efficiency, the greatest input the frameworks can provide is to increase predictability and 
reduce incrementalist practices. According to the opinions of those interviewed, this has occurred 
in Peru to a limited extent. The perception in the spending ministries is that a MTEF that 
provides certainty with respect to the flow of funds for a period greater than one year could be 
useful in avoiding under-disbursement as a result of rigid administrative procedures.  
 




The MTF was introduced in Argentina in 1999. Previously, there were some budget tools with a 
multiannual horizon such as the Public Investment Law that stipulated a three-year plan for 
investment spending.  
Although it does not replicate the annual budget, the MTF entails a level of detail that 
makes it the closest to doing so among the cases reviewed. This framework not only includes the 
functional classification and administrative unit, but also incorporates information by program 
(even if it does not take into account the lower levels of this classification, such as subprogram, 
                                                            
11 This situation is not intrinsic to the Peruvian case, but is associated with the function given to the framework.  
Evaluation of the MTFF in Mozambique reveals the same situation. From this case it is apparent that without an 
effective connection between budgeting and strategic planning, the framework becomes simply a tool to achieve 
fiscal discipline (Batley, Bjørnestad and Cumbi, 2006). 
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activity, project, and works) with the expected trends for the physical goals and their sources of 
financing. As a result, it meets the characteristics of a MTEF.
12  
As observed in Colombia and Peru, the Argentine experience originated in a broader 
fiscal reform promoted by an agreement with the IMF. The adoption of a Fiscal Responsibility 
Law by the national government (Law 25,152) implied, among other obligations, the 
commitment of the national executive branch to prepare a multiannual budget of at least three 
years. Given the prevailing economic situation and the latent fiscal crisis, the objective was 
mainly to achieve a time period of predictability in the reduction of the deficit.  
Thus, since 1999, all the agencies that compose the national administration annually 
prepare a document known as a Multiannual Budget in a process which is integrated with the 
process for formulating the National Budget Law Proposal.  This integration implies not only 
sharing the financial information system, but also a single timetable to be followed by the 
administrative units.  
The first step in the preparation of the framework consists in the preparation of ceilings 
for each year of the three-year period for each national agency by the National Budget Office 
(NBO). For this budget, the NBO relies on different offices that perform the projections from the 
information used. The spending ministries can provide preliminary budgets that serve as an input 
in defining the ceilings. Combining the inputs produced by the sectoral officers of the NBO with 
the restrictions on consolidated expenditures imposed by the fiscal goals, the ceilings for each 
administrative unit are established. Through this exercise, the annual ceilings are also 
established. Based on those ceilings, the agencies prepare their provisional drafts of annual and 
multiannual budgets. Since budget ceilings are usually lower than initially required (either in the 
preliminary budgets or from the needs stated to the NBO), administrative units tend to submit 
“over-the-ceiling” budgets. They do not have to necessarily maintain the same programming for 
the second and third years, since possible termination of existing programs and the 
implementation of new policies are taken into account.  
After a period of political decisions in which the demands from the different units are 
rejected or approved by the Chief of the Cabinet,
13 the proposed annual budget is submitted to 
                                                            
12 It includes projections of resources by categories; expenditure projections by purpose, function, and of an 
economic nature; investments program for the period; programming of credit operations from multilateral agencies; 
description of the budgetary policies that support the projections and the expected economic and financial results. 
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the legislative branch. It should be noted that the multiannual budget presented to congress is for 




Table 7 shows that during the first years following the devaluation, the projections diverged 
significantly from the actual values. That situation improved over time, particularly with regard 
to inflation projections. However, with regard to the GDP, the continuous and apparent 
differences suggest the strategic use of the projections. This is probably the result of the use of 
this practice in the preparation of the annual budget. Since the differences between projected and 
observed primary results are low, it can be inferred that a portion of the resources are allocated in 
a discretionary manner by the executive. 
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Source: Authors’ compilation based on multiannual budgets, Ministry of Finance, Secretariat of Economic 
Policy and the National Statistics and Census Institute (INDEC).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
13 Although there are technical recommendations made by the NBO to accept them or not, the final decision is made 
by the Chief of Cabinet. The role played by the Ministry of the Treasury varies in accordance with the idiosyncrasy 
of the person who heads the institution.  
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5.3.3 The Budget Process 
 
Although the MTF functions correctly, according to evaluations made by former staff members 
of the NBO (Vega, 2004), in practice the MTF exhibits various deficiencies that minimize its 
positive effect on the budget process. One of the reasons for this is that, despite the advice of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1999), the framework was not promoted in an environment 
in which the fiscal balance was ensured, but during the development of one of the most profound 
fiscal crises in Argentina. In fact, in the period 2002-2004, the MTF was not prepared due to the 
volatile characteristics of the existing crisis.  
This situation has threatened the accuracy of the macro-fiscal projections developed.   
This problem, in addition to the strategic use of projections (Abuelafia et al., 2009), has eroded 
the credibility of multiannual budgeting. Low credibility in turn was furthered by the limited 
dissemination of this instrument among relevant political, technical and academic actors. One 
indicator of this is that concerns or comments have not been made on the multiannual budgets 
prepared (Vega, 2004), something that also has not occurred in Colombia nor Peru, where 
Congress does not discuss the MTF in depth. However, another symptom revealing little interest 
on the part of policymakers in the multiannual process is the fact that demands for more funds 
above the ceilings established by the NBO are made in respect to the annual budget, which is the 
one with legal force. The ceilings for the subsequent years are not discussed until they coincide 
with the current year.  
Probably, one of the most decisive factors that explain the limited involvement of 
politicians and the technical sectors is the absence of a planning entity to support the allocation 
of funds from the multiannual budgets. The lack of a plan to serve as a foundation for the 
budgeting process is compounded by the fact of having to adhere to a very tight timetable for the 
preparation of the budget, making it difficult to embark on planning tasks. The result has been 
that, in practice, the multiannual budget consists of a formal exercise in which the budget of the 
first year of the multiannual budget is extended into the future (Vega, 2004).  
Paradoxically, despite having a very complex tool, since it is not based on comprehensive 
planning, the logic that ends up prevailing is similar to that in Peru: strengthening fiscal 
restrictions without achieving very much in terms of strategic allocation of resources and 
technical efficiency.  
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Another deficiency of the multiannual budget is that, despite the new norm of the Federal 
System of Fiscal Responsibility, most social spending is the responsibility of the provinces and is 
not part of a multiannual budget. In the future this situation should change based on the approval 
of Law 25,917 in 2004. This law created the Federal System of Fiscal Responsibility, which, 
among other things, establishes the preparation of multiannual budgets by the national 
government, the provincial governments, and the government of the Autonomous City of Buenos 




5.3.4 Conclusions for Argentina 
 
Despite the various deficiencies mentioned, the perception that prevails in the National Budget 
Office is that the MTF has been beneficial for the budget process. It is emphasized in particular 
that the exercise of forecasting itself results in a probable scenario and provides inputs to 
improve the budgets of subsequent fiscal years.  
Beyond that, the need for a greater role of those responsible for managing the preparation 
of the budgets of the agencies is recognized. This point brings to light the underlying issue that 
lies beneath the limitations of the MTF in Argentina: medium-term budgeting appears detached 
from the planning of medium-term sectoral policies.  
The lack of a space in which to integrate the different planning initiatives limits 
multiannual budgeting. The result is the impossibility of implementing a comprehensive process. 
As a result, the MTF ends up being nothing more than a reinforcement of the fiscal restriction.  
 
5.4 Conclusions of the Case Studies 
 
The three cases analyzed differ in respect to the depth of the coverage and objectives of the 
medium-term framework that was implemented. Peru has an MTFF, Colombia an MTBF, and 
Argentina an MTEF. Despite this difference, all the frameworks were part of fiscal reform 
processes promoted by the IMF. As a result, all the experiences initially reflected a bias toward 
the prioritization of objectives linked to the achievement of fiscal sustainability.  
                                                            
14 The jurisdictions that have promoted it are: Buenos Aires, Chubut, Córdoba, Entre Ríos, Formosa, Mendoza, Río 
Negro, San Juan, Santa Cruz, Santa Fe, Tucumán, and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (CABA). All include 
projections of the resources by category and economic classification. With regard to expenditures, most of them 
classify by economic function while only CABA, Córdoba, Entre Ríos, Mendoza, Río Negro, and Santa Fe do so by 
objective and function (Federal Council on Fiscal Responsibility, 2007). 
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This situation probably hinders ownership of the MTF on the part of local policymakers 
as a tool to facilitate budgetary management. In Peru, the choice was a scheme that is totally 
divorced from the planning processes.  As a consequence, the MTF preparation process is not 
very participatory.  
The Colombian experience reveals an interesting case where implementation occurred 
gradually. In the first place, the adopted MTFF limited planning or the participation of the 
spending ministers in the establishment of the budget ceilings. When the medium-term scheme 
was strengthened, according to the perception of the actors, the medium-term budget constraints 
had already been internalized. Although its implementation is too recent to permit an adequate 
evaluation, based on an agreement between the central actors in the process (Ministry of Finance 
and NPD) and the spending ministries, an area was established in which it is possible to discuss 
the financing of medium-term sectoral policies.  
Although a scheme that theoretically favors the integration of budgeting and planning 
was chosen in the Argentine case, in practice this objective has not been achieved. Still, in a 
country with a long experience in working with a modern financial management system, the lack 
of institutionalized planning entities has led to a multiannual budget that, in practice, is only a 
formal exercise. In turn, the fact that the implementation of this tool coincided with one of the 
most profound economic crises in Argentine history and, subsequently, with a change in the role 
assumed by the state in the delivery of economic services, has hindered its proper performance.  
The lesson learned from these three experiences is the need for greater institutional 
learning. In Colombia this process has been perhaps more fluid because of the gradual 
implementation of the MTFF and the MTEF in a scenario in which medium-term sectoral 
planning was already consolidated in a government plan. This approach has been recommended 
by several experts (Boex et al., 1998, and Schiavo-Campo 2009). Initiatives such as the social 
framework in Peru and the Strategic Territorial Development Plan in Argentina may signal the 
beginning of an evolution toward the integration of the political, planning, and budgeting 
processes.  
There are some difficulties common to the three countries that conspire against the odds 
of integrating these processes.  First, the representativeness of the budgets is limited. The two 
countries that allow the participation of civil society in the preparation of sectoral goals do so in 
an institutional setting that is not directly linked to the MTF. The participation of civil society 
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actors with a stake in sectoral policies could provide greater legitimacy to these frameworks that 
may, on occasion, encompass periods from different governments.  
It is not only civil society that seems to be excluded from the formulation of the 
frameworks. The role of legislative branches in Latin America in the medium-term frameworks 
is minimal. Although at times it can be attractive for the executive branch not to subject the 
frameworks to debate, if they are not discussed in the legislatures, their political sustainability 
cannot be guaranteed.  
Finally, the lack of coordination between government levels is also a weakness common 
to the cases discussed. This problem is particularly limiting in federal countries such as 
Argentina where the degree of decentralization of public policies is substantial. In order to 
resolve this, it is not only necessary to establish consistent MTFs for the different levels of 
government, but also to establish mechanisms that facilitate information flow and allow joint 
planning and coordination of policy execution at the different levels of government.  
 
6. Final Thoughts  
  
The experience of implementing MTFs in Latin America (except for the particular case of 
Uruguay) is relatively recent if compared with that of developed countries or even Africa, since 
the first attempts took place at the end of the 1990s. However, their use is quite extensive. In the 
coming years, when some countries that are already developing the use of this tool are added, 
most of the region will have medium-term frameworks.  
  The time in which the frameworks were adopted and the actors who promoted them have 
influenced the logic of their implementation. Those countries that adopted this tool as a part of 
agreements with the IMF—leading to Fiscal Responsibility Laws—were aimed more at seeking 
fiscal sustainability (even Colombia, which today has a MTEF, began with a MTFF). In turn, 
those countries where poverty reduction plans favored a greater role of other international 
organizations in the budget problems (such as Honduras and Nicaragua) opted for the MTEF. 
This is similar to what is observed in Africa, where the World Bank played a key role in the 
implementation of MTFs.  
  Although MTFs’ recent application makes it premature to identify what problems are 
related to a lack of experience in the use of the instrument and which are due to more serious 
causes, among the weaknesses of the frameworks are problems related to the participation of key 
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actors, coordination between different levels of government, the estimation of projections, and 
the quality of financial statistics. 
  Low participation in the preparation of the MTF by actors who play an important role in 
the execution of the annual budget (spending ministries, Congress, civil society) make it difficult 
to strike a balance between the objectives of facilitating and improving planning and ensuring 
fiscal sustainability. In order to achieve a better balance between the medium-term sectoral goals 
and the fiscal or medium-term expenditure frameworks, the participation of stakeholders in the 
preparation processes of these frameworks should be sought. This should also take place within 
the ministries, where at times coordination between the management and budgeting units is not 
as fluid as it should be.  
  The lack of coordination with subnational governments affects both the objective of 
improving fiscal sustainability and increasing efficiency. In some cases, like that of Argentina, 
sub-national governments are not included in the MTF. In others, the delay in the arrival of 
financial information on sub-national governments and the form in which it is presented prevents 
an evaluation of their effect on sustainability. With respect to the efficiency of expenditures, 
coordination deficiencies between the different levels of government and problems in 
information flows result in an overlapping of programs and the impossibility of establishing a 
results-based budget. All these problems work against attempts at using this tool to establish 
medium-term guidelines.  
  The quality of statistics and the estimation of projections is another issue that threatens 
the positive development of the frameworks. Only with quality information can the frameworks 
serve the purpose of guiding the investment moving forward. With respect to the estimations, 
many of the MTFs seem to reproduce the deficiencies observed in the annual budgets. For 
example, they strategically use the macroeconomic projections (over or underestimation of 
economic growth) to boost the discretion of the executive branch in managing the budget.  
  Beyond these specific problems, the use of this tool warrants its detailed analysis and 
expansion in many countries. These processes are gradual and generate feedback dynamics with 
budget processes and political-institutional frameworks, thus their impact is not immediate. 
Given their relatively recent implementation vis-à-vis other experiences, the lack of development 
of the systems is understandable. Still, it is peremptory to incorporate some of the lessons 
provided by experience before moving forward with the extension of the frameworks. 
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First, the experience of developing countries shows that, at least at first, the use of limited 
MTEF (MTBF) is advisable. Implementing the broader MTEF requires the management of 
technical and human resources that often are outside the scope of developing countries. This 
effort can be counterproductive, because it diverts these resources from more productive uses. 
For those countries with greater capacities, the MTEF has potential advantages because it 
provides a perspective of results-based budgeting. In those cases where technical capabilities 
allow it, MTFs should be integrated in greater depth with the planning processes and with other 
fiscal management tools such as stabilization funds and results-based budgeting. 
Second, the study of the experiences highlights that it is important that the fiscal 
framework, in any of its three versions, be as broad as possible. That is, it should not leave out 
expenditures of other levels of government, or extra-budgetary funds or quasi-fiscal activities. 
Also, it is advisable for only one administrative unit to coordinate all aspects of the budget. It is 
also suggested that this unit publish a document centered on the MTEF in which both the fiscal 
goals and the priorities and sectoral policies are discussed. To do this, the work of the spending 
sectors in the development of strategic approaches that also include community stakeholders is 
important (Holmes and Evans, 2003).  
Third, expectations should be in line with feasibility; otherwise, expected goals are not 
always met. For example, improvement of the government’s fiscal balance is almost impossible 
to achieve if growth estimations are out of sync with reality. Usually, there is a statistically 
significant relationship between the degree of ambition of the MTF in terms of the extent of 
reduction it aims for, and its degree of compliance (European Commission, 2007).  
Fourth, success is linked to the fiscal situation at the moment of implementation; 
therefore, countries that want to advance in the development of MTFs should be in a financially 
sound situation before seeking to obtain large benefits from the MTF (IMF, 1999). Otherwise, 
fiscal imbalances can affect the predictability of financing flows. However, it may also happen 
that in those countries with sustainability problems, the MTEF can help improve the budget 
process if the projections are made with honesty and realism (Holmes and Evans, 2003).  
Finally, the strategic use of the projections, a mechanism usually used to increase the 
discretion of the executive branch over the budget, is a clear example of practices that undermine 
the positive effects of the MTFs because it takes credibility away from the projections (Jonung 
and Larch, 2006; Hallerberg, Scartascini and Stein, 2009a). Furthermore, if discretionary use of 
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projections is made to reduce the space of other actors, efforts to link planning with budgeting 
will always face difficulties in succeeding.  
  Summarizing, MTFs should neither be sold nor bought as a magical solution. Otherwise, 
unsatisfactory results over the short and medium term may lead to disenchantment and trigger 
the discontinuation of the use of the frameworks. MTFs are one tool among many that may help 
to overcome some of the ills of the budgetary process and help countries in their quest for 
development and greater government accountability—but only if they are implemented correctly. 
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